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1. Introduction
Since the onset of the financial crisis in East Asian in 1997, China has caught the attention not only
for its critical foreign exchange policy but also for the uncertainty and vulnerabilities in its financial sys-
tem dominated by the state-owned commercial banks. Careful observation of the economy may lead one
to conclude that the Chinese economy is not immune to the crisis. Growth and foreign direct investment
slowed significantly in 1998 and there is no sign of recovery in the first half of 1999. There exists a
dualism in the China’s financial system. While state-owned enterprises obtain financing mainly from
state-owned commercial banks, the rapid growing non-state-owned part of the production sector has dif-
ficulties to access the financial facilities in the state-owned commercial banks. The inefficiency in the
state-owned enterprises and the heavy intervention on the lending decisions of state-owned commercial
banks by the administrative authorities have caused a serious nonperforming loan problem. This paper
intend to analyze the causes of financial vulnerabilities in the China’s state-owned commercial banks
and to give some policy suggestions drawing form the experiences of Japan. The remaining parts of the
paper are organized as follows: Section 2 of the paper describes the vulnerabilities in and causes of
China’s State-owned Banking System. Section 3 reviews Japan’s experiences and discusses what
lessons China shall learn from Japan’s experiences. Section 4 concludes by providing some future per-
spectives for solving the financial vulnerabilities in China’s financial system.
2. Financial Vulnerabilities in the China’s State-owned Banking System
2.1 Financial Vulnerabilities
There exist serious vulnerabilities in the China’s financial system, especially in its banking sector. The
financial vulnerabilities manifest themselves in the following ways. First, the nonperforming loans have
increased to a dangerous level. In 1997, the proportion of nonperforming loans was 24 percent for the
four state-owned commercial bank, including 6 percent bad debts and 18 percent overdue loans (Dai,
1998; CCER, 1998). Other estimates given by foreign observers ranged from 20% to upwards of 35%.
The problem of nonperforming loans in China is by any measure immense.  The exact magnitude of the
problem is hard to know because of the lack of transparence in accounting practices of China’s banks. 
Second, all the state banks are significantly under-capitalized, illustrating the banks’ fragility in sound
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operation and lack of capacities in dealing with asset losses. Table 1 shows that the state-owned special-
ized banks started off, in 1985, with sufficient capital to meet the 8% ratio required according to the
Basle standards. However, capital adequacy has eroded steadily in three of the four state-owned com-
mercial banks, with only the Bank of China displaying some increases in capital adequacy, at least up to
1992. After 1992, there is substantial further worsening in capital adequacy ratios. In 1996 the capital
adequacy ratios for all four state-owned financial banks was significantly lower than the 8 percent that is
required by China’s Commercial Bank Law.
Third, all state-owned commercial banks operated inefficiently. The annual circulation rate of bank
loans was very low and fell consistently in the 1990s from 1.32 in 1993 to 1.07 in 1996 for the four
state-owned commercial banks.1 The average profit-to-net asset ratio was 5.6 percent in 1996. This net
profit rate could turn out to be a net loss if the uncollected interest payments were not counted as rev-
enues. In 1996, the four bank only collected about 60% of the due interest payments (Li, 1998).
Finally, there is a rising trend in the gap between bank deposit and loan.2 It might due to (1) the weak-
ening economy and rising real interest rates (2) the reluctance to make loans on the banks’ side or (3)
tightening of monetary policy through credit control. More fundamentally, the reason of such a phenom-
enon may be that there were serious inefficiencies in the banking sector. Between 1992 and 1996, there
were two years, 1994 and 1995, when domestic financial sector’s increased debt was greater than its
increased assets (Li, Y, 1998). New deposits were thus wasted either to support those nonperforming
loans that would never be repaid or to cover the increasing costs of bank operation. Such a banking sys-
tem is not sustainable.
2.2. Causes of the Problems: Financial Liberalization in Retrospective
The creation and development of these vulnerabilities were closely associated with the interaction
between real and financial sectors and the unsuccessful financial liberalization process in China. The
route of the fund allocation during the pre-reform period was almost exclusively governed by the state
plans. The People’s Bank of China, the central bank in China, was a subordinate body of the Department
Table 1 Capital Adequate Ratios of Major Banks
Year Industrial-Commercial Bank Agricultural Bank Bank of Construction Bank of China
1985 10.00% 12.60% n.a. 4.40%
1986 8.90% 11.80% n.a. 5.40%
1987 9.10% 10.70% n.a. 4.30%
1988 7.20% 9.90% 9.20% 5.60%
1989 7.40% 8.80% 8.20% 7.00%
1990 6.80% 7.40% 7.50% 6.70%
1991 6.70% 6.50% 6.50% 6.60%
1992 6.60% 6.30% 6.50% 7.90%
1996 4.35% 3.49% 4.81% 4.84%
Source: Data complied from PBOC, Almanac of Finance and Banking in China, various years; Zhao
Wenjie. (1996), Monetary Policies and Transmission Mechanism in China [Zhongguo Huobi Zhengce
Chuandao Jizhi]; Du Xuncheng. (1996), Financial Innovation during Economic Transformation [Jingji
Zhuanxingzhong de Jinrong Chuangxin] 
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of Finance at that time. Its role was to provide supplementary working capital to the state-owned enter-
prises. Reforms introduced aimed to distinguish budget and banking financing of investment in an
attempt to improve the efficiency of capital utilization. While the policy-oriented investment would con-
tinue to be covered by government funding, other financial needs including those by the state-owned
enterprises would be met through the banking sector on a commercial basis.3
In 1978, only 24 percent of the total provision of funds (for both fixed assets and working capital)
were supplied through the state-banking sector. This proportion rose to 88 percent in 1997. These
changes are the root of the weakening in the financial system. First, even though the reform policies
introduced intended to establish a truly independent central bank and purely commercial state-owned
commercial banks, this have never been achieved. Since the close connection between state-owned com-
mercial banks and local governments, banks’ lending decisions can hardly be free from administrative
intervention.
At the same time, the government fiscal capacity declined relatively during the reform period. The
share of budget revenues in GDP fell from 31.2 percent in 1978 to 10.8 percent in 1996. The govern-
ment thus routinely sought resources from the state-owned commercial banks to support the projects and
activities that should otherwise be covered by the state budget. This is an implicit transfer of the govern-
ment budget to the commercial banks’ balance sheets. Notwithstanding decreased fiscal revenues, fiscal
subsidies have fallen both as a share of GDP and that of the government budget. Table 2 shows the pic-
ture of implicit transfer of budget/policy loans in China. Data in the Table 2 provide a very misleading
picture. Although explicit fiscal subsidies have fallen in real terms, governmental support of state-
owned enterprises has not. It has merely been shifted to the banks in the form of policy loans. The main
categories of policy-oriented lending include (1) loans for investment in fixed assets of basic industry
and infrastructure; (2) loans for working capital for purchase of agricultural products and import/export
activities; and (3) loans for agricultural production, poverty alleviation, regional development and
research activities. Even after the creation of three policy banks in 1994, the state-owned commercial
banks continued to be burdened with policy loans. In the 1990s, these policy-oriented loans accounted
for about 35 percent of total loans made by the state banks. The repayment rates of the policy loans were
often extremely low due to poor management and abuse (Institute of Economics, 1998). If losses of poli-
cy loans were accounted, China’s budget deficit would be much higher than the officially reported fig-
ure of around 2 percent. 
Table 2 Losses of Industrial State Owned Enterprises and Fiscal Subsidies to All Loss Making State
Owned Enterprises
total losses Fiscal subsidies fiscal subsidies fiscal subsidies
(RMB billions) (RMB billions) % of GDP % of budget
1990 62.8 57.9 3.1 19
1991 66.7 51 2.4 15
1992 66.9 44.5 1.7 12
1993 74.3 41.1 1.2 9
1994 81.8 36.6 0.8 6
1995 104.9 32.8 0.6 5
1996 132.1 33.7 0.5 4
Source: Lardy, Nicholas. (1998), China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution: Washington DC, Brookings
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State-owned enterprises in china rely heavily on bank loans for their financing need. In fact, many
new state-owned enterprises were built using exclusively bank loans.4 The debt-to-equity ratio rose
quickly from 19 percent in 1980 to 79 percent in 1994. Combined with inefficiency in the state-owned
enterprises, this caused great difficulties for enterprise operation. In 1997, for instance, the total real
interest income from the bank loans was 361.4 billion yuan, about eight times the total profit of the
state-owned industrial enterprises. 
On the part of the enterprises, reforms were not yet successful in eliminating the ‘soft budget’ prob-
lems. Managers and employees of the state-owned enterprises not only lacked incentive to run the firms
efficiently but also have felt no pressures to repay the bank loans as “both banks and enterprises are
owned by the state”. The state banks became the victims of their loans to the state-owned enterprises.
The government, for stability reasons, does not want to see closures of state-owned enterprises.
Consequently, the banks not only failed to recover the old loans but were also forced to make new loans.
State-owned banks do not worry, as they feel that they are not responsible for the deteriorating balance
sheet caused by lending decisions influenced by administrative interventions. This created a moral haz-
ard problem and further weakened the state-banking sector.
2.3 Unsuccessful financial liberalization
The preceding part has described how government administrative intervention on the state commercial
banking system and transferring of government deficit budget to state commercial banks’ balance sheet
lead to a financially weakened banking system. A further implication of the situation is that attempts at
incremental liberalization often fail. When the overall financial system is liberalized, there is a large out-
flow of funds from the state banking system. This creates liquidity shortages and generally leads the
government to regain control over the financial system. Depositors looking for higher interest rates, i.e.
looking to escape the increasing implicit taxation that is rapidly becoming confiscatory, move funds into
informal, risky channels. These episodes are particularly likely to occur when liberalization intersects
with accelerating inflation (as occurred, for example, in 1985, 1988, and 1992-93). Disintermediation
creates a liquidity crisis in the banking system, to which the government responds in three ways. The
central bank injects reserves into the commercial banks; administrative restrictions on non-bank finan-
cial institutions (formal and informal, legal and illegal) are tightened; and ultimately the deposit rate is
increased, typically to the rate of inflation for term deposits. At this point, the implicit tax on the bank-
ing system is at its maximum. Deposit rates are high while lending rates are low. The implicit subsidies
received through increased central bank lending are insufficient to offset the implicit taxation in the
interest rate differential. 
The high implicit tax on the banking system sustains the large and persistent presence of “irregular”
financial institutions despite of government’s attempts to restrain their development. Extra-budgetary
funds are large, and are managed by government agencies so that they won’t have to pay the punitive
taxes levied on funds that go through the banking system.5 For example, the growth of various Trust and
Investment Companies (TICs) in China can be understood as the attempt to avoid punitive taxation on
the banking system. Many of the TICs have been established by state banks: 181 of 394 authorized TICs
in September 1995 were associated with the specialized (commercial) banks. Many of the others are
subordinate to local governments. The TICs provide convenient outlets for bank money to avoid regula-
tory strictures and seek out higher returns than are available through regulated lending. As we will see in
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the next paragraph such funds are frequently channeled into the stock markets.
Attempts to develop the capital markets faltered after 1992. Concerned about the rapid drain of funds
from the banking system, and an acute funds shortage in 1992-93, Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji at that time,
in charge of economic policy, adopted a series of measures to restrict the operation of bank subsidiaries.
These policies caused the relative shrinkage of the stock market. However, while these policies retarded
capital market development, they were quite effective in restraining the excessive growth of aggregate
demand, which was building up during 1993. Adoption of restrictive credit policies turned out to be
essential and effective. Inflation accelerated to a peak annual rate of 28% during 1994, but began to
come down shortly thereafter. By May 1997, the consumer price index had come down to under a 3%
annual growth rate. Macroeconomic stabilization-a “soft landing”-was achieved, but at the cost of abort-
ing the ongoing financial liberalization, in particular the development of capital markets. If sustained,
though, macroeconomic stability will prepare the ground for further financial reform, under more favor-
able conditions.
Because of the unsuccessful financial liberalization attempts, banking sector continue to assume its
central role in providing state-owned enterprises with financing and thus kept on being haunted by the
nonperforming loan problem.
3. Lessons from the Japanese Experiences
3.1 Slow responses of Japan in dealing of its financial problem
Japan represents the second largest economy in the world. It has experienced serious financial disrup-
tions in the process of liberalizing its financial system starting from mid-1970s. In dealing with disrup-
tions during the financial liberalization process, Japan’s case has suggested the heavy cost of slow
actions. Japan’s disruption manifested after the collapse of asset prices (equity and land) in the early
90s. Japan’s financial system deteriorated with huge nonperforming loans. For the first time since 1950,
Japan was forced to abandon the policy of no failure of financial institutions and use deposit insurance
funds to close a number of insolvent institutions over the 1991-1995 period.6 The insolvencies depleted
the reserves of the deposit insurance agency and made the Deposit Insurance Corporation de facto insol-
vent.7
After a hurry of legislative actions in June 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto’s call for a “Big Bang”
approach to financial reform in November 1996, and another set of financial reforms in the spring of
1997, the Japanese situation appeared to stabilize with some signs of recovery.  Official estimates of
nonperforming loans declined from $500 billion in 1995 to $300 billion in 1996 and the economy
appeared to be on the road to recovery. A series of financial scandals in the securities industry, the fail-
ure of a large insurance company, the failure of several securities companies including Yamaichi
Securities — the fourth largest securities company in Japan, and the failure of several large regional and
city banks reversed the trend and the Japanese financial system deteriorated further in the last part of
1997.
As of early 1998, the Japanese situation has not improved. On January 12, 1997 the Ministry of
Finance officially acknowledged what outsiders had been maintaining for years that the nonperforming
loan problem was far larger than previous official estimates. The Ministry announced that in the six
months to September 30, 1997 problem bank loans totaled ¥76.7 trillion and acknowledged the estimate
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did not include problem loans at credit cooperatives, insurance companies, and other institutions nor did
it reflect the impact of collapsing financial systems in other Asian countries since September 30.
There are some indications that the regulatory authorities are willing to depart from the traditional
Japanese financial regime by allowing insolvent institutions to fail, strengthening financial regulation
and supervision, and calling for public funds to be used to solve the financial crisis.  Much of this falls
under the heading of “prompt corrective action”.
3.2 Some issues relevant to financial vulnerabilities: A comparison of Japan and China
3.2.1 Deposit Guarantees and Moral Hazard:
Deposit guarantees possess significant moral hazard and failure to modify the deposit guarantee sys-
tem in the face of financial liberalization creates a fundamental flaw that will make the financial system
inefficient and unstable. Deposit guarantees eliminate deposit discipline and encourage risk taking on
the part of depository institutions while at the same time, liberalization enhances the ability to manage
and assume risk. The outcome is imprudent loan and investment portfolio behavior on the part of depos-
itory institutions.
Deposit guarantees were pervasive in Japan, formed an important component of the mutual support
system between financial institutions, politicians, and the Ministry of Finance as well as being compli-
cated by the existence of a large postal savings system (Cargill, 1993). Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito
(1997) discuss how these guarantees contributed to Japan’s bubble economy in the second half of the
1980s and persist to misallocate financial resources in the 1990s.
Thus, deposit guarantees while desirable at some level to protect small depositors and limit contagion,
possess moral hazard. Moral hazard becomes an important element in portfolio management as liberal-
ization enhances the ability of financial institutions to assume and manage risk. Deposit guarantees at a
minimum need to be reduced if liberalization is to proceed smoothly. Post-bubble economic, political,
and regulatory conditions rendered the “no failure” norm inoperable, yet no coherent substitute was in
place to address the serious problems facing Japanese banks. Policymakers in Japan struggled against
political and bureaucratic inertia to move in the direction to establish a framework governing bank risk
regulation, failed bank resolutions, and bank recapitalizations. First, a system of prompt corrective
action based on objective criteria was instituted to deal with financial institutions in failing health.8
Second, another bill enacted in 1996 conferred upon regulators the authority to initiate corporate reorga-
nization or bankruptcy procedures with respect to financial institutions to deal with insolvencies in a
more formal and timely manner.9
These measures show that regulators will allow and even force insolvent banks to exit the market — a
major departure from past Japanese financial practices. In order to prepare for this eventuality, other
bills raised deposit insurance premiums10 and established two public collection agencies11 for the recov-
ery of assets of failed institutions. In view of the seriousness of the financial situation and the inadequa-
cy of past disclosure practices, however, the government guaranteed all deposits (including those above
the statutory payoff limit of ¥10 million) through fiscal year 2000.
In China, there is also an implicit deposit guarantee. Unlike Japan’s case, guarantee on deposit is sim-
ply because that major commercial banks are owned by the state. The safety of deposits is thus depend-
ing on the ability of the government to tax and issue debts. This reflects in the over-confidence of depos-
itors in the nation’s banking system despite the severe non-performing loan problem within the state-
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owned commercial banks. On the banks’ side, the moral hazard takes the form of lending under political
pressures rather than commercial considerations. Savings are channeled to low inefficient investment in
such an institutional setting thus creating a typical shallow economy with emphasis on the quantity of
investment12 while productivity of investment has been overlooked. This in the short run can lead to a
macroeconomic growth due to an increasing investment but in the long run will cause a structural prob-
lem, as the increased supply does not match the demand qualitatively. Banking supervision in China is
far from being adequate. Moral hazard and rent seeking activities at the microeconomic level is wide-
spread. All these problems lead to the nonperforming loan problem in China’s state-owned commercial
banks. 
3.2.2. Agency Problems: 
The subsidy inherent in deposit guarantees, the political relationships between regulatory authorities
and those institutions benefiting from deposit guarantees and the time inconsistency of short-run discre-
tionary decision making combined together provided incentives for regulatory authorities to adopt poli-
cies that were a mixture of delay, forgiveness and forbearance in dealing with troubled financial institu-
tions. The failure to deal decisively with troubled financial institutions by adopting policies that rely on
an expected return to favorable economic conditions (lower interest rates, increased interest rate spreads
between cost of funds and return on assets, and/or recovered asset prices) had aggravated the problems
in the financial sector. It had increased the moral hazard problem, reduced the efficiency of the financial
sector, reduced the credibility of the regulatory authority, and ultimately increased the amount of funds
that will be required to deal with the troubled financial institutions. 
The Ministry of Finance in Japan had followed the steps in first denying, then understating the prob-
lem and then following up with a series of policies that were firmly based on forgiveness and forbear-
ance. One explanation points out that regulating authorities are captured by financial institutions they
are supposed to supervise. Financial institutions are usually places where regulating staffs acquire
employment after retirement. In this way, financial institutions attempt to buy off regulating authorities
and to hold back policy changes unfavorable to them (Aoki, 1988).
In China’s case, the agency problem is also severe. State bank as the major creditor has failed to
enforce the debt contract. In a market economy, debts play an important role in corporate governance
through bankruptcy threat. Nevertheless, this is not a case in China. Rather, bankruptcy has been widely
used by enterprises and local governments as a way to write off debts instead of disciplining managers
(ICBC Bankruptcy Research Group, 1997). Second reason for the creditor failure is that the incentive
system of state banks is not adequately structured. Managers of state banks in China care for only
accounting numbers rather than the real value of the bank asset. This is because their careers and private
benefits all depend only on the accounting numbers rather than the real value of assets. Third reason is
that some central government agencies (such as the State Economic and Trade Commission and the
State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System) have biases towards debtors against credi-
tors because their delegated task is to “invigorate SOEs (state-owned enterprises)” rather than “take care
of SOBs (state-owned banks)”. As the bank lending cannot be made on a sound commercial base free
from political influence, there is a problem of who should be responsible for the resulting nonperform-
ing loan. Consequently, finding out a solution to the problem has been slow. Ownership of the state
banks continues to be expressed in vague and inconsistent ways that do not provide bank managers with
adequate incentives for making appropriate loan decision.
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Agency problems have prevented regulating authorities from carrying out a prompt solution for the
nonperforming problem once it have occurred. To design an incentive-compatible rules for corporate
governance and establish effective institutions to ensure their implementation is essential to the solution
of agency problems. 
3.2.3 Lack of Transparency
The lack of transparency in financial system has at least two dimensions. First, it makes it difficult to
assess the condition of financial institutions and large nonfinancial corporations; and second, it enhances
the potential for regulatory authorities, financial institutions, and businesses to engage in mutual sup-
port, restrain competition, perpetuate insularity, and conceal the real cost of government failure in the
financial system. In general, the lack of transparency provides misleading information to the regulatory
authorities, understates the degree of balance sheet deterioration, enhances the moral hazard problem,
and contributes to delay response to dealing with troubled institutions. Lack of transparency in all
dimensions is a major characteristic of Japanese financial regime. The government long restraining poli-
cies on the bond and stock markets in favor of intermediation through banks has established a financial
structure in which corporate enterprises rely on borrowings from banks for their external financing.  As
a result disclosure of information to the public was not a common practice for corporate enterprises in
Japan as their main financial sources were the borrowing from financial institutions especially banks
rather than from bond and stock market. Furthermore, the stock market has been trivialized by eliminat-
ing its role as a market for corporate control. The rules and customs serving this purpose include mutual
long-term shareholding and issuance of new shares to existing shareholders at par value. This elevated
the role of banks to monitor credit risk through a system of long term “customer relationships” that
relied on institutional knowledge rather than open public disclosure.
The lack of transparency has been a serious problem in Japan.  Resistance to publishing meaningful
statistics on the condition of banks and nonfinancial corporations makes it difficult to assess risk expo-
sure and hence increases the potential for contagion. Lack of transparency makes regulatory credibility
more difficult to sustain, easier to loose, and increases the potential for delay, forgiveness, and forbear-
ance in dealing with troubled institutions.
Transparency problem is also serious in China. The problem is due to both of a lack of past practices
in providing information to the market participants and a lack of a strict accounting rule to address the
nonperforming loan problem. First, classification procedures are much more lenient than international
standards.  “Past due loans” are those not paid by the extended due date, “doubtful loans” are past due
for greater than two years, or after the  project in question has been canceled, and “bad debt” is still
unpaid after the borrower has gone bankrupt and undergone liquidation. Bad loans, according to interna-
tional standards, are those with interest or principal past due for more than 180 days, while in china, the
principal must be past due by greater than two years. Classification internationally is based on risk
assessment, while in China it is based on the payment status of principal.  A five-year bullet loan13 could
be nonperforming for seven years before classified as “doubtful” and could not be declared as “bad
debt”. Chinese banks, contrary to international practice, only classify the loan past due, not all loans to
the company, and only the portion of the principal past due, not the total loan. Other questionable prac-
tices exist as well, but these practices clearly show that reported percentages of nonperforming loans are
most probably understated (Lardy, 1998). 
Authorities have made some efforts to increase the transparency in the state-owned banking sector by
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separating policy and specialized state-owned commercial banks to encourage operating on commercial
principles. The separating of policy and commercial banks would greatly relieve the market participants
to explain the financial information of the commercial banks. But in practice it had ignored two vital
points: (1) the policy banks did not take on the previously made policy loans of the specialized banks,
leaving them with hurting balance sheets and unable to operate on commercial principles, and (2) the
specialized state-owned banks are themselves the main source of funds for the policy banks, and were
obligated to purchase bonds issued by policy banks. 
3.2.4 Public funding:
Japan has been reluctant to call for public funding. The 1996 bailout of the jusen or housing loan com-
panies in Japan used a relatively small sum of public funds (¥6 trillion), but was met with such intense
public criticism that politicians have been reluctant to go to the public for additional funding.  However,
the situation has changed as Japan’s financial system deteriorated further in late 1997.  In December
Japan announced that it intended to sell ¥10 trillion in bonds with the proceeds combined with as much
as ¥20 trillion loans to the Resolution and Collection Bank. The pooled funds would then be used to bail
out the nation’s banks; however, many questions remain as to how the funds are to be utilized, especial-
ly as to whether Japan is ready to impose serious market discipline on troubled financial institutions. 
In Japan, the public is clearly unfavorable to the use of taxpayer funds to deal with insolvent institu-
tions and nonperforming loans. The financial regimes in Japan systems have been designed to limit
household access to support high savings and provide funds to the business sector to support industrial-
ization.  In the past, high rates of economic growth compensated the household sector for limited access,
but in recent times, lower and unstable economic growth provides little offset.  In addition, there is
widespread consensus among the public that the financial system has been designed and regulated to
primarily serve the interests of the government, financial institutions, and the business sector. The bad
debt problems of the 1990s revealed numerous examples of unethical and illegal activities14.
Consequently, the public in Japan opposes the use of taxpayer funds to solve the financial problems and
the political leaders have been reluctant to make a case for public funding.
In China, deteriorating government fiscal position and inefficient tax-collecting system make it diffi-
cult to solve the nonperforming loan problem by resorting to tax revenues. However, relative low gov-
ernment debt to GDP ratio opens the possibility to strengthen the under capitalized state-owned com-
mercial banks by issuing government bond. The government has raised 270 billion yuan through
issuance of treasury bonds to increase the adequate ratios to 8 percent for state commercial banks in
1998. Such practices encountered less resistance than that in Japan as the political decision processes are
quite different in the two countries15.
The comparison and contrast with Japan is made easy as China like Japan has a bank-dominated
financial system in which the hand of government is heavy. China and Japan have exhibited similar
problems of insolvent financial institutions, nonperforming loans, and a financial and regulatory struc-
ture increasingly incompatible with current economic and technological forces. Above comparisons
show that there exist in both Japan and China similar microeconomic reasons for financial troubles in
their banking sectors. A major difference between Japan and China is that major banks in China are
owned by state, bailout of them does not have as much as political resistances as  in Japan.
3.3 Lessons that China should draw from Japan’s experiences:
Coping with Financial Vulnerabilities in China 67
China’s state commercial banks have been making loans to inefficient and loss-making state owned
enterprises because of the administrative intervention. Japan’s banking problems rooted in loans made to
jusen and housing companies when they competed each other for the market share after the financial lib-
eralization initiating in the middle 1970s. Despite of the difference in origination of nonperforming loan
problems in two countries, they share one thing in common that without solving the nonperforming
loans the banking systems, which is a stock problem, banks’ lending decisions, which are flow prob-
lems, will be severely affected. The most important difference between the banking problems of Japan
and China is that the problems in Japan have partially caused and largely compounded a deepening
recession, while in China robust growth continues. It is imperative that Chinese authorities can learn the
lessons of Japan to heart before it is too late. 
The chief similarities between the Chinese and Japanese banking situation are the overly rapid expan-
sion of credit, the soaring debt to equity ratios of enterprises, the mounting nonperforming loans, inade-
quate capital. Furthermore, both systems had induced loans be made on criteria other than the profitabil-
ity of the ventures.  Japanese rapid expansion of credit in the late 80’s and soaring real estate values are
mirrored in what happened in the mid 1990’s Chinese economy when there was a speculation on real
assets and stock. 
In Japan, “to facilitate the implementation of industrial policy, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) tightly
regulated Japanese banks throughout much of the last four decades. In return, banks were ensured that
the ministry would not allow them to fail. In this collusive environment, banks had no incentive to
develop a proper appreciation of risk analysis and risk management, and MOF was not motivated to
exercise appropriate supervisory functions” (Ito, 1998).  Similarly, in China policy loans were the vehi-
cle for carrying out the state’s industrial policy and failure of banks and state-owned enterprises were
simply not options that can be easily adopted.  This also created a severe moral hazard because bank and
state-owned enterprise managers knew that they would not be held accountable for losses.  Hard budget
constraints did not exist in either case, and the legacy of those decisions is hurting Japan still, and may
start to adversely affect China in the near future. 
It is argued that the only way for Japan to start growing again would be to cut back on loans consider-
ably, to raise rates for risky clients and to allow inefficient companies to go bankruptcy or be taken over
by new owners (Alexander, 1998). Facing difficulties in gaining a public consensus to use public fund in
solving the bad loan problem in the banking sector, price-keeping operations (PKOs)16 had been taken as
an attempt to prop up the market so that the inadequacy of the banks’ capital was not exposed. Frequent
PKOs have had the effect of holding the stock market above its natural clearing level and this has had
the unfortunate consequence of inhibiting the issue of new equity. PKOs, as an easy solution seen by
MOF to the inadequate capital base in the banking sector, had kept the stock market above its natural
equilibrium level. It had prevented the proper function of the equity market, As a result, companies were
not able to attract sufficient investment to rebuild their base of equity and a recovery of the economy
was inhibited.
The implicit message to China is that reform of the banking system, if done properly, will be quite
painful in the short run, but that it will prevent a lot worse agony in the long run. Japan’s prolonged and
deepening recession is a case study in what happens if banking reforms are put off for too long. While it
is correct in positing that reforms must not be delayed, an important differences between Japan and
China is that China’s banks are state owned and hence cannot be nationalized. State commercial banks
in China have access to capital based on the ability of the state to tax and issue debt. Considering the
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size of the state commercial bank, closure of any bank will cause a panic in the economy and is out of
range of the policy choices. A prompt solution of the nonperfoming loan problem in China may require
the freezing of the existing nonperforming loans and make new loans on a commercial base. However,
this solution may cause financial difficulties for the state-owned enterprises, so it would be better to lib-
eralize the capital markets for the state-owned enterprises to have alternative sources of funding. In any
case, the policy loans made must be written off and the implicit government debt must become explicit. 
Nonperforming loans associated with the collapse of a bubble economy and pessimistic expectations
on the future economic performance, which make a rapid recovery of asset prices less possible could
explain the weakening balance sheet of Japanese banks. With the changing of authorities’ stance from a
“no failure” norm to a “prompt corrective action” norm, banks are trying hard to improve their financial
health. This has adversely affected their lending attitude and is a major cause for the credit crunch.
Exacerbating moral hazard problems and putting off painful but necessary restructuring, the Bank of
Japan, the government-run Japan Development Bank, and other governmental agencies have stepped in
to fill the gap, making loans and buying commercial paper. This is directly analogous to the policy lend-
ing of Chinese banks and the soft budget constraints they cause. The main lesson China can learn from
Japan is what not to do.  If China does not actually reform the lending practices of its banks and the
operating procedures of the State-owned enterprises, it will have to recapitalize repeatedly as new lend-
ings are made on non-economic criteria.
The ongoing agency problems within the banks undermine what would otherwise be an obvious
avenue of approach to enterprise restructuring, which is to have the banks play a greatly enhanced role
as monitors of newly restructured enterprise management groups. Clearly, the banks are important
stakeholders in China’s corporations. Most SOEs rely on the banks for virtually the totality of their
external financing. Moreover, banks provide substantial amounts of long-term capital, which strengthens
the argument for long-term links between banks and enterprises, including the formation of financial
groups. Obviously this gives the banks a potentially strong role in disciplining enterprise behavior, since
enterprises have limited alternative sources of finance. In recognition of the large stake banks hold cur-
rently in State-owned enterprises, banks should be encouraged to put representatives on Boards of
Directors, and the current prohibition of banks holding equity should be relaxed (though not eliminated).
Banks should be allowed to hold small equity stakes, perhaps for limited periods (up to two years) as
part of restructuring efforts. This would help banks gain experience, provide better incentives, and pre-
pare banks for a more active monitoring role in the future. But such measures can only provide a small
incremental benefit under current conditions. In addition, it is essential that the government move quick-
ly and decisively to restructure the banks themselves. Enterprise restructuring without bank restructuring
is unlikely, in the long run, to be successful. Control over financial enterprises ought also to be restruc-
tured, and the role of government ownership reduced. 
3.4 Policy response of China to the nonperforming problems:
The Japanese experiences of slow responses prolonged recession resulting in “corrective action” has
shown the cost of delaying major reforms. In early 1998, Chinese authorities announced an ambitious
reform program, including completion of reforms of the banks and the state-owned enterprises within
three years. Small and medium enterprises are to be liberalized through bankruptcy, selling, merging
and share holding, the government will focus on restructuring and efficiency improvement of only 1000
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large enterprises in key industries.
In the banking sector, first, commercial banks are required to run transactions on purely commercial
basis. Regional headquarters of the People’s Bank of China are to be established replacing the provincial
branches to ensure minimum disturbance from local officials. At the same time, the central bank also
tightened supervision and regulation of banks and other financial institutions (Lardy, 1998). Second,
controls over credit quotas are to be abolished. Total loans of commercial banks are determined accord-
ingly to an asset-to-liability ratio management system. But the guidance credit quota will remain in
place. Commercial banks will also be given more room in setting their own interest rates. The financial
authorities are set to achieve the objective of commercialization of banks and marketization of interest
rate. Third, the central bank has lowered the interest rates on the central bank loans six times since early
1996. This gave the state-owned enterprises a total annual saving on interest payment of 190 billion
yuan. Fourth, the central government also committed substantial funds to finance write-offs of enterpris-
es’ bad debts. And fifth, international practices have been introduced to the banking sector, including the
accounting method and bank assessment system. A new scheme for classifying five types of nonoper-
foming loans, which is consistent with the international standards, has been introduced in 1998. All
these measures were designed to tickle the underlying causes of nonperforming loans mentioned in the
previous part.
4. Future Perspective:
It is difficult to predict how the financial vulnerabilities in China will develop in the future. Japan’s
experiences has shown how heavy cost the economy have to pay if neglecting calls to liberalize the
domestic financial system, dispose of nonperforming loans, reduce government credit allocation,
improve monitoring and supervision, and impose penalties for failure. Japan’s experience has shown
that most of important changes have been in response to external pressure rather than an internal politi-
cal decision to recognize the shortcomings of the previous financial regime. What would be the external
and internal pressure for China? Political stability has the highest priority in the policy makers’ mind in
China. The internal pressure for China to liberalize its financial system would be most probably come
from the consideration that a delay in liberalization would cause a severe financial crisis that negatively
affects the political stability. On the other hand, a rapid liberalization is also not desirable since it will do
harm to the state power as it hurts the vested group in the country. WTO negotiation has showed that,
like in Japan, external pressure would probably play an important role in pressing the Chinese govern-
ment to liberalize its financial system.
Though the Japanese experiences suggest that a prompt solution to financial system fragility is desir-
able. The Asian financial crisis brings difficulties to financial reform in China while demonstrating the
urgency for change. The Chinese economy is losing growth momentum both because external shock
from neighboring countries and from internal austerity programs introduced in the earlier years (Song,
1998). To retain a relatively high growth rate, the government seeks stimulation from fiscal and mone-
tary measures through dramatic increases in investment. This encourages the overruling of commercial
considerations by administrative instructions, in order to lift the growth rate of GDP and exports, and
thus undermines the reform efforts in the financial sector. If economic growth slides, the triangular debts
between state-owned enterprises, and thus nonperforming loans of the banks, would again accumulate
quickly. An economy with slow growth also has limited ability to offer new jobs. This creates further
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difficulties for restructuring enterprises.
Given all the vulnerabilities and weakness of China’s financial and banking system, the main engine
keeping the inefficient banks running is the ever growing household deposits. Between 1990 and 1996,
household deposits grew at 33 percent per annum. This growth was made possible by two factors, one is
the lack of alternative financial investment opportunities as the market for equity and debts are underde-
veloped, bank deposits was the only major option left for households and the other is household still
confident about the safety of the state banks. The growth of household deposits has already started to
slow down (only about 20 percent in 1997), and this trend is likely to continue. China’s GDP growth
and thus household income growth will fall somewhat given the adverse external shock. Observing the
closure of banks and other financial institutions and introduction of non-state banks, the public may
increasingly recognize the importance of risk assessment. The markets for equity and debt will develop
rapidly in China and more options will be available for financial investment. 
The financial vulnerabilities of Chinese financial system will not turn to a crisis for the time being.
However, if the current high proportion of nonperforming loans, low circulation rate and high deposit-
loan gap remain, a significant slow down in growth of the deposits may well trigger a domestic financial
crisis. To avert such a crisis, financial reform needs to be pushed forward more quickly. the eventual
successfulness of China’s financial reform depends on addressing of three questions: (1) how to improve
the financial institutions financial position. (2) how to stop the creation of new inefficiency? and (3)
how to transform the state-owned banks into independent commercial banks?
The outcome of the financial liberalization will, therefore, be largely depend on changes in other sec-
tors, especially reform of the state-owned enterprises and the public finance system. Otherwise non-per-
forming loans will not stop accumulating. Nonperforming loans should be transferred or written off in a
proper way to avoid the moral hazard problem. Further development of non-bank financial institutions,
especially market for debt and equity, is not only useful for diversifying financial risks but also helpful
in offering competition to inefficient banking sector. However, drawing from the Japanese experience in
late 1980s, authorities should establish a sound supervision system before the competition can be
encouraged. Otherwise, fierce competition together with an inadequate supervision will make financial
institutions to increase portfolio risk to counteract the competitive risk they are facing.
Endnote
1 The ratio achieved in many Southeast Asian economies before the crisis was around 3 (Li, 1998).
2 In 1995, the total gap was 291 billion yuan for all state commercial banks, this was increased to 744 billion yuan in
1996 and 810 billion yuan in the first half of 1998 (Li, 1998).
3 This was implemented under the “loan for grant” reform in 1983 and 1984 (Ma, 1997).
4 One may raise the question that if these firms were truly state-owned because the state had not invest a single cent,
they were considered to be state-owned enterprises only owing to the fact that state had helped them get loans from
commercial banks. This practice of state was normally not carried out for firms other than state-owned.
5 Note that bank deposits owned by enterprises and organizations never enjoy the inflation protection that household
deposits receive
6 Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC), a special corporation, was established under the Deposit Insurance Law
(Law No. 34 of 1971) with capital contributed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Bank of Japan (BOJ), and
private financial institutions. The statutory payoff limit has been increased several times and is currently ¥10 mil-
lion per depositor. In addition, deposits at agricultural cooperatives are protected under a separate statute. Deposits
Coping with Financial Vulnerabilities in China 71
in a postal savings system are also covered by an explicit guarantee.
7 Since its inception, the DIC was poorly funded, understaffed, and largely subsumed within the operations of the
BOJ. The deposit insurance fund has never been used to pay off depositors of a failed institution. And although
there were Japanese bank failures in the 1970s and 1980s, the deposit insurance fund was not utilized until 1992,
when the DIC provided financial assistance to facilitate a rescue merger for a small failed bank (DIC, 1998;
Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan, 1994).
8 Banking Law, article 26; Banking Law Enforcement Order No.10 of March 21, 1982, as amended, articles 21-2,
21-3. The prompt corrective action regime took effect in April 1998.
9 Bill to Implement Special Procedures for Reorganizing Financial Institutions, Law No. 95 of 1996.
10 Bill to Amend the Deposit Insurance Law, Law No. 96 of 1996.
11 Two public collection agencies are Housing Loan Administration Corp. (HLAC) and Resolution and Collection
Bank (RCB). The HLAC was established under the Special Measures Law to Promote the Resolution of the Assets
and Liabilities of the Jusen Companies, Law No. 93 of 1996. The RCB was established under the Bill to Amend
the Deposit Insurance Law, Law No. 96 of 1996.
12 The financial deepening approach, pioneered by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), has been used to study eco-
nomic development (Fry 1988, King and Levine 1993, Saint-Paul 1992, Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990). It
argues that the shortage of such financial resources as domestic saving, foreign investment and bank loan is not
the crucial constraint in growth and productivity, but rather institutional rigidities such as government imposed
interest rate ceiling that led to inefficiencies in investment.
13 A bank term loan that calls for no amortization.
14 For example, securities firms had given guarantees of high positive rates of return to favored investors on their
equity portfolio as in the case of Nomura Securities VIP list. [“The Weekly Post Special 3: TWP Obtains
Confidential Document from Nomura Security Fraud Case”, The Weekly Post (Japan), July 14, 1997 website].
Large banks introduced crooked clients to subsidiary banks or credit cooperatives in order to keep questionable
loans off their own books (“HLAC Plans to Sue Four Banks that Got Jusen to Make Risky Loans”, Japan Digest,
January 26, 1998, p.1). Ministry of Finance officials gave banks advance warning of “surprise” inspections in
exchange for lavish entertainment and other favors (“MOF Bribery Scandal Reveals Backroom Financial Deals”,
Nikkei Net, January 27, 1998 website)
15 In other words, the socialization of the losses in the financial system in China can be taken out relatively easy
because of the less democratic political decision making process. Nevertheless, such a advantage, though in the
short-run can ensure a prompt solution in the long-run can turn into the root of future wrong decisions.
16 Typically, PKOs are carried out by the MOF ordering that funds in publicly-controlled accounts (such as public
pension or postal life insurance) be used to make share purchases, indiscriminate of underlying value, while it also
directly or indirectly restricts the flow of new issues into the market.
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